The weak response by the uninsured to initiatives encouraging voluntary enrollment in health insurance has raised concerns regarding the extent to which the uninsured value insurance. This concern is also relevant for proposals to mandate health insurance coverage since workers will suffer welfare losses if compelled to purchase coverage they perceive to be of little value. To address this issue, we use the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to examine decisions by single workers to seek out and enroll in employersponsored insurance. We find that single workers with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance are less likely to have jobs that offer coverage or to enroll in coverage when offered. Our results suggest a dual approach to expanding coverage that includes both subsidies and educational efforts regarding the value of health insurance.
Policy initiatives seeking to expand health insurance opportunities for uninsured Americans remain prominent on the public agenda. Apart from the systemwide reform of the Clinton administration's Health Security Act of 1993, most initiatives over the last two decades have been incremental in nature, targeting specific groups among the uninsured and relying upon their voluntary participation. 1 Such proposals typically have been introduced with high expectations of success. However, past evidence from demonstration projects, simulations of responses by the uninsured to proposed subsidies, and experience with public insurance expansions suggest that the response by targeted groups may be disappointing. These findings also indicate that large subsidies may be required to induce participation in private coverage and that intensive outreach efforts may be necessary to overcome informational and administrative impediments to enrollment in public coverage (Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin 1997; Bilheimer and Colby 2001; Gruber and Levitt 2000; McLaughlin and Zellers 1992; Thorpe et al. 1992; Selden, Banthin, and Cohen 1998; Marquis and Long 1995) .
The lack of responsiveness to such coverage initiatives has perplexed researchers and policymakers alike who justify the value of expanded health insurance along several dimensions. These include: the ''merit good'' aspect of health insurance; the negative externalities from underconsumption of medical care; the financing burden on taxpayers and public institutions from providing care directly to the uninsured; the impact on health care expenditures from the provision of services in inappropriate settings; and the implications for the health of the uninsured from financial barriers to the timely receipt of care.
From a policymaker's perspective, the points previously noted may be reasonable rationales for expanded coverage. However, the weak responsiveness of the uninsured, both actual and simulated, has raised the issue of whether targeted groups value health insurance relative to other uses of income, or perceive the benefits of public coverage to be commensurate with any direct and indirect costs of participation. Indeed, in their review of evidence regarding enrollment into a variety of public programs, Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001, p. 15 ) note that ''[i]t may well be that potential recipients do not value health insurance as strongly as policy analysts do-a possibility worth exploring in depth.' ' Bilheimer and Colby (2001, p. 93 ) also acknowledge that ''instilling awareness of the value of health insurance'' is an important component of strategies to enroll and retain people eligible for private or public insurance programs. Finally, Peterson (2004, p.174) notes that among the ''stark lessons'' learned regarding state efforts to expand insurance coverage is that ''because many . . . do not understand or are skeptical about the value of insurance, offering coverage does not translate into people accepting it.'' While individual valuation of health insurance is fundamental for approaches that would encourage voluntary participation in private and public health insurance, it also has important implications for proposals to mandate employment-sponsored health insurance (ESI) and individual coverage. Such an approach recently has received much attention as in the mandates implemented by Massachusetts and proposed in California, and in proposals for national health insurance advanced by several presidential contenders. As Summers (1989) has observed, mandated approaches may be more efficient than alternative tax-based approaches pro-vided that workers fully value the mandated benefits. Thus, understanding the extent to which targeted populations value health insurance not only can affect the success of particular policy instruments but also may govern selection of which instrument to apply. 2 Finally, from a methodological perspective, individual tastes for coverage underlie the demand relationship for health insurance. Such demand estimation requires that tastes for coverage (or reasonable proxies) be held constant in order to obtain unbiased estimates of price and income effects. For example, estimates of price effects for enrolling in ESI may be overstated should workers with strong preferences for coverage sort into firms with more favorable out-of-pocket premium costs. In empirical work, such tastes are frequently represented by individual characteristics such as age, gender, race/ ethnicity, and educational attainment. 3 However, analysts have little sense of whether these commonly used proxies display any relationship to an individual's tastes for coverage. More to the point, Pudney (1989, p. 34) has cautioned that ''. . . not all variation in preferences is likely to be explicable solely in terms of observed demographic and social factors.''
In this paper, we examine several aspects of the relationship between preferences for health insurance and decisions to seek out and enroll in ESI. Using self-reported attitudinal measures from the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), we consider the extent to which adults with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance are more likely to be uninsured than those with strong preferences. Focusing on workers, we apply econometric models to examine whether single workers with weak or uncertain preferences are more likely than those with strong preferences to sort into jobs without health insurance and are less likely to enroll in offered coverage.
Our findings reveal that adults with weak or uncertain preferences for coverage are more likely to be uninsured than those with strong preferences. Depending on the type of preference measure used, we find that having weak or uncertain preferences for coverage compared to strong preferences is associated with a lower likelihood that a single worker will have a job that offers ESI or enroll in such coverage when offered. Our results are consistent with a dual approach to expanding coverage that includes both subsidies and educational efforts to inform targeted groups among the uninsured about the value of health insurance.
In this paper, we first provide a brief review of research on the role of health insurance preferences in coverage decisions and outline our analytical framework. Next, we describe our data and empirical specification, and present descriptive tabulations of the prevalence of weak or uncertain health insurance preferences, and their association with health insurance status, and with the offer and takeup of ESI. Our econometric results regarding job sorting and enrollment decisions follow, and we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.
Background and Analytical Framework

Previous Research on the Role of Health Insurance Preferences
It has long been recognized that worker preferences for health insurance are likely to underlie decisions by employers to provide health insurance. For example, early research by Goldstein and Pauly (1976) first explicitly posited that workers sort among alternative employment opportunities according to their tastes for health insurance, and subsequent analyses (e.g., Pauly 1986; Feldman et al. 1997) also have acknowledged such behavior. However, these studies did not provide empirical tests of the sorting hypothesis. Most recently, workforce characteristics (such as age, gender, and wage distribution), presumed to impart information about health insurance preferences, have been used to explore the role of worker preferences in employer decisions regarding the content of health insurance benefits (e.g., Moran, Chernew, and Hirth 2001; Bundorf 2002; Gruber and Lettau 2004) .
To date, there have been only a few papers that have explored the role of health insurance preferences on the employment and health insurance decisions of individuals and households. Long and Marquis (1992) inferred that weak preferences for health insurance may contribute to the low take-up rates by young and low-wage workers as they found that the characteristics of workers who turn down offered coverage resembled those of workers in jobs that failed to offer coverage. Using a constructed measure of risk tolerance from the Health and Retirement Survey, Barsky et al. (1997, p. 556) found that more risk-tolerant individuals were less likely to have health insurance. Additionally, they found that for employed people, ''risk tolerance . . . seems to be an important factor sorting individuals into jobs with health insurance.'' Using responses to questions regarding attitudes toward health insurance from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), we (Monheit and Vistnes 1999) found that weak preferences for coverage were an important factor in decisions by single wage earners to sort into jobs without health insurance. Our analysis also suggested the presence of ''imperfect sorting'' since a sizable proportion (29%) of such workers failed to obtain jobs consistent with their preferences for coverage. Hirth et al. (2006) , using data from the 2003 Community Tracking Survey, also found evidence consistent with imperfect labor market sorting. Based on predicted probabilities of coverage, they estimated that 20.4% of workers were ''mismatched'' with regard to their health insurance preferences and employer offers of health insurance. Finally, among the selfemployed, Monheit and Harvey (1993) applied NMES attitudinal data and found that those with weak tastes for health insurance were less likely to obtain ESI or to provide such coverage to wage earners in their employ. Additionally, Barsky et al. (1997) found that the self-employed had high tolerance for risk and on average were less likely to be insured than wage earners.
Analytical Approach
As noted earlier, our examination focuses on the relationship between preferences for coverage and decisions by single workers to seek out and enroll in ESI. First, we consider whether single workers sort among jobs that offer or fail to offer health insurance according to their preferences for coverage. Next, given the decision to obtain a job that provides coverage, we examine the role played by preferences and other factors in the decision to take up offered coverage.
In developing our analytical approach, we invoke the standard economic assumption that preferences are exogenous and independent of prices for specific commodities. That is, preferences for health insurance reflect an individual's willingness to trade income (consumption of goods and services) for health insurance, and market prices determine whether and the extent to which that person will in fact do so. However, as we subsequently note, the assumption of strict exogeneity of preferences and their independence from the price of health insurance posited in our analytical framework may not hold when we consider survey respondents' answers to questions regarding health insurance preferences. For example, survey respondents may have price in mind when they are answering such questions. Additionally, prior or current experience with health insurance also may condition responses about preferences for coverage and risk behavior. This will have implications for our ability to claim a strictly causal relationship between preferences and offers of coverage, and preferences and enrollment decisions. 4 Obtaining a job offer with health insurance. To examine the first process, we apply and extend the simple model of job search for single workers from our earlier work (Monheit and Vistnes 1999). In this model, we posit that when selecting a job, an individual will compare the utility of jobs that offer or fail to offer health insurance and select the former if its utility exceeds that of a job offer without health insurance. The utility of each job is characterized by wage income, search costs, expected out-of-pocket medical expenses (which depend on whether the job provides health insurance), and preferences for health insurance (which affect the position and shape of the individual's utility function). We include search costs in the model as such costs may impede some workers from obtaining their desired jobs and thus may contribute to imperfect sorting according to health insurance preferences.
As we have shown in our earlier paper, the comparison based upon linear utility functions yields the following estimating equation (subscripts O and N indicate jobs that offer/ do not offer health insurance, and S and W indicate strong or weak preferences):
This probability is negatively related to the gain in wage income between jobs without and with coverage (W N 2 W O ) and positively related to factors associated with the increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditures (M N ) if the job does not offer coverage. 5 This probability decreases as search costs for a job with coverage increase relative to the costs of finding a job without coverage (C O 2 C N ). Since workers with weak preferences for coverage (T W 5 1, T S 5 0) obtain higher utility from a job without insurance than from one with coverage, they will be more likely to obtain the former while those with strong preferences will be more likely to obtain the latter. 6 We assume (e N 2 e O ) to have a logistic distribution and estimate the model as a logit equation.
Preferences and the decision to enroll in offered coverage. To estimate the role of health insurance preferences on the decision to enroll in offered coverage, we next consider a simple model of insurance participation. For single workers, let U I (Y I , P; T) + e I represent the utility from insurance and U N (Y N , M; T) + e N represent the utility from not obtaining health insurance. In these expressions, Y I and Y N represent income in the insured and uninsured states, M represents expected out-of-pocket medical expenses when uninsured (assumed to be zero when insured), P represents out-of-pocket premium costs, T represents preferences for coverage, and e I and e N are stochastic error terms. An individual will enroll if U I (Y I , P; T) 2 U N (Y N , M; T) . e N 2 e I . Expressing this difference as a simple linear function of Y, P, and the difference in tastes, T S and T W , we obtain the rule for the probability of enrollment:
This probability increases with income, decreases with higher out-of-pocket premiums, increases with expected medical expenditures, increases for individuals with strong preferences for coverage, and decreases for individuals with weak preferences. Assuming (e N 2 e I ) to be logistically distributed, coefficient estimates will be derived from a logit equation of the likelihood of enrollment.
Note that we estimate the logit equations for the likelihood of obtaining an offer of health insurance and for enrolling in offered coverage as reduced-form equations. We discuss the set of regressors used in each equation specification in the following section.
Data and Empirical Specification
The data used in this study are from the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, a nationally representative two-year household panel survey sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The MEPS provides national estimates of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population's access to, use of, and expenditures for health care, health and health insurance status, demographic characteristics, economic status, and employment and job characteristics. Questions on respondent attitudes toward health insurance, risk-taking behavior, and the medical care system are contained in a self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) asked of adults about the time of the second-and fourth-round household interviews. The 2001 MEPS included approximately 14,000 households consisting of nearly 33,500 individuals.
For this analysis, our full sample consisted of 14,342 individuals (workers and nonworkers, excluding full-time students) ages 18 to 64 who responded directly to the SAQ (we excluded proxy respondents). 7 We used this sample to provide estimates of the prevalence of weak preferences among these adults and also (in Table 1 ) of the percentage of this population who are uninsured according to health insurance preferences. For our analysis of job search and enrollment decisions, we identified a sample of single wage earners ages 18 to 54 and excluded the selfemployed. We constrained the upper age limit to 54 to avoid complications associated with individuals having other ESI through a job prior to retirement. For similar reasons, we also excluded observations with coverage from a job other than a current main job (e.g., coverage through the Consoldiated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act [CO-BRA] or another job held at the same time) or with military coverage (e.g., TRICARE) and a small number with missing information on seatbelt use. Within these constraints, MEPS included 3,450 unmarried wage earners. By eliminating proxy respondents to the SAQ, our sample of single workers was reduced to 2,987 wage earners. 8 All estimates presented have been weighted using the MEPS-SAQ weight and standard errors have been adjusted for the complex sample design of MEPS. Unless otherwise indicated, all findings reported in the text are statistically significant at least at the .05% level. 
Health Insurance Preferences
Respondents to the MEPS-SAQ are asked whether they agree strongly, agree somewhat, are uncertain, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following four attitudinal statements regarding health insurance, risk, and the medical care system:
1. I'm healthy enough that I really don't need health insurance; 2. Health insurance is not worth the money it costs; 3. I'm more likely to take risks than the average person; 4. I can overcome illness without help from a medically trained person.
The first two statements are directly related to an individual's preferences for health insurance and capture different aspects of its value. In contrast, the last two statements provide measures that are likely to be indirectly associated with attitudes toward health insurance.
Responses to these attitudinal questions were obtained independently of survey questions regarding health insurance status (i.e., through a separate survey instrument). This separation may have the advantage of mitigating concerns that responses indicating weak preferences for coverage might be a rationale for lacking coverage. However, as noted previously, it also is possible that survey responses to questions about preferences for coverage may, in fact, be conditioned on the prevailing price for coverage faced by respondents. If this is the case, and we cannot observe the prices that conditioned such responses, then it is possible that our preference measures may be endogenous. Such a response process would limit our ability to claim strict causality between preferences and offers of coverage and enrollment decisions. Additionally, should responses reflect past or current experience with health insurance, our ability to claim that our attitudinal measures are exogenous also may be compromised. Given these concerns, we adopted a more conservative approach to the interpretation of our empirical findings, discussing our results in terms of the association between preferences and the outcomes of interest rather than claiming a strictly causal relationship.
Considering each of the attitudinal statements independently, respondents who strongly or somewhat agreed with a specific statement were classified as having weak preferences for coverage. Those who responded that they were uncertain with regard to a specific statement were classified as having uncertain preferences, while those who strongly or somewhat disagreed with a specific statement were considered to have strong preferences for coverage.
Finally, we included two additional variables in our specifications that also impart information about attitudes toward health risk. The first variable is a dichotomous measure of whether an individual is a smoker. In addition to information on an individual's health status, this variable may convey information about attitudes regarding risk-taking behavior with respect to health. The second variable is another indirect measure of health risk obtained through responses to a question regarding seatbelt use. We included several measures of seatbelt use (whether the individual uses seatbelts always [the omitted category], nearly always, sometimes, seldom, or never). 9
Specification of Econometric Models
In addition to the variables described previously, our reduced-form empirical models of job search and enrollment draw upon the following data. In our model of job search, we assume that the wage differential (gain) from taking a job without health insurance will be positively related to the costs of health insurance. We proxy variation in health insurance costs through the inclusion of the worker's occupation, region of residence, urban or rural locale, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' hospital wage index. Additionally, as in Monheit and Vistnes (1999) , we note that the wage differential also may reflect differences in age, gender, race/ethnicity, and education, and further note that workers receiving more generous health plans (such as older, more experienced, and better educated workers) may obtain a larger wage gain by taking a job without coverage compared to other workers. We also assume that out-of-pocket medical expenses (M N ) depend on the health status of individuals, the number of children in the household, and whether any children or parents are eligible for Medicaid/State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). 10 Additionally, we also note that out-of-pocket spending may reflect risk-taking behaviors, as captured by our measures of smoking behavior and seat belt use.
As regards the difference in search costs for jobs with and without coverage, we use proxy variables such as the county unemployment rate from the Area Resource File (higher unemployment rates may increase the costs of the search for job offers with coverage) and, the proportion of establishments in the worker's county of residence with fewer than 10 employees and with 10 to 19 employees. (We posit that search costs rise for jobs with health insurance and fall for jobs without coverage when there are more small employers in a county.) 11 Older (presumably more experienced) and more educated workers also may have easier access to jobs with ESI than those who are younger or less educated and, therefore, have lower search costs for jobs with insurance offers. In addition, despite limits on insurers' use of pre-existing health conditions, workers with health problems also may incur additional search costs to find jobs for which they may be eligible for coverage. 12 A key component of our analysis of enrollment in offered coverage is to assess how the explicit use of our preference measures is associated with participation in ESI, and whether income and price responsiveness changes when health insurance preferences are excluded. In our empirical model, we included income defined as a percentage of the federal poverty line. To assess price responsiveness, we constructed state/establishment size-specific means of annual employee out-of-pocket premium costs for single coverage derived from establishment-level data in the MEPS Insurance Component (IC). We matched person-level data from the MEPS Household Component to areaspecific estimates (mean values of employee out-of-pocket contributions) from the IC based upon state and establishment size. We acknowledge that this strategy for premium construction has some shortcomings. In particular, since we use an average measure, we necessarily reduce the variation in premiums across our sample observations. Our strategy also eliminates the possibility that some workers face zero out-of-pocket premiums. However, since the 2001 MEPS does not have a person-level link with an adequate response rate from its household component to its insurance component, our strategy represents a second-best approach to estimating the role of out-of-pocket premiums on enrollment decisions.
Since some of the variation in premium costs may reflect geographic and firm size differences in health insurance benefits and payment provisions, we also included variables accounting for the presence of particular insurance provisions by state and establishment size in preliminary econometric specifications. However, since such variables were correlated with the premium data, their inclusion did not improve the statistical significance of the premium coefficients in our enrollment equations. In addition, the coefficients on most of the benefit variables were themselves statistically insignificant. Consequently, we excluded the benefit variables from our enrollment equations. Thus, variation in our estimates of premium contributions may reflect some differences in the quantity or quality of insurance provided.
Finally, since we posit that expected out-ofpocket medical spending also will affect enrollment decisions, we assume that such spending will depend on the health status of individuals, the number of children in the household, whether any children or parents are eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP, and healthrelated risk-taking behavior (as proxied by smoking behavior and seat belt use).
Descriptive Findings
Prevalence of Weak Preferences
Overall, we find that people reporting weak preferences represent a minority of all adults aged 18 to 64, and the prevalence of such preferences is lowest for the response to the statement ''healthy enough, don't need coverage'' (9.0% of adults). We find that over a fifth of respondents report weak preferences for health insurance based on the other measures.
Were we to add the prevalence of uncertain preferences to these tabulations (so that we consider all adults without strong preferences for coverage), the tabulations would increase to 14.5% with weak or uncertain preferences based upon ''healthy enough, don't need coverage,'' 34.4% based upon ''health insurance is not worth the cost,'' 35.8% for ''more likely to take risks,'' and 33.8% for the ''overcome illness'' statement.
In Table 1 , we consider whether people with weak or uncertain preferences are more likely to be uninsured all year compared to people with strong preferences. For the two direct preference measures, we find that the former groups were more than twice as likely as the latter to be uninsured throughout 2001. For the indirect ''take risk'' measure, roughly a fifth of adults reporting weak preferences (i.e., risk takers) were uninsured all year, as were 18.1% of those with uncertain preferences. By comparison, only 11.3% of adults who were not risk takers (strong preferences) were uninsured all year. Finally, we also observe small but statistically significant differences in the likelihood of being uninsured all year for people who report weak or uncertain preferences in response to the ''overcome illness'' statement compared to those with strong preferences. 13
Health Insurance Preferences, Offers of Coverage, and Enrollment
In Table 2 , we provide descriptive data on whether single wage earners with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance are less likely to obtain or ''sort'' into jobs that offer coverage compared to those with strong preferences, and whether the former groups are also less likely to enroll in offered coverage. To conserve space, and as a prelude to our econometric analysis, we examine the two direct preference measures and the ''take risk'' measure. Using the direct preference measures, we find that single workers with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to have jobs with coverage or be enrolled in offered coverage than those with strong preferences. Using the ''take risk'' measure, we also find that single workers with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to have job offers with health insurance than their counterparts with strong preferences.
Presence of Imperfect Sorting
While the descriptive statistics of Table 2 are consistent with worker sorting by health insurance preferences, we also find such sorting to be imperfect. For example, using the ''healthy, don't need coverage'' measure and considering single wage earners ages 18 to 54 who either reported strong or weak preferences, we find that 28.1% of such workers are mismatched, having preferences for coverage that are inconsistent with the availability of coverage at their jobs. Of this total, 18.7% of such workers have strong preferences for coverage and are without jobs that provide insurance, while 9.4% have weak preferences but are offered coverage.
As noted in our earlier work (Monheit and Vistnes 1999), such findings raise the issue of whether search costs, human capital, or other impediments to jobs preclude some workers from obtaining jobs that meet their preferences for coverage. Despite strong preferences, some workers may lack the requisite human capital to obtain job offers with coverage, while other workers with weak preferences but substantial human capital may find it difficult to avoid employment in jobs that do not offer coverage.
Econometric Results
In this section, we apply the empirical models described earlier to examine whether preferences and other factors are associated with having a job that offers ESI and enrolling in offered coverage. Using reduced-form logit models, we first examine the likelihood of having a job offering ESI; we then model the decision to enroll in offered coverage (i.e., conditional on being offered ESI, whether the worker takes up the offer). We present findings for each of the direct preference measures. Since findings for the indirect preference measures were not as robust, we limit the presentation of our results to the ''take risk'' measure. 14 To avoid any problems associated with correlation among these measures, we also estimate separate equations for each of the preference measures. In Table 3 , we report marginal effects (percentage-point changes) associated with changes in specific variables. 15 Results presented in Table 3 indicate that preferences for health insurance are associated with the likelihood that single workers obtain jobs that offer health insurance and enroll in offered coverage. 16 The baseline offer rate for single workers is 75.3%. Considering responses to ''healthy, don't need coverage,'' we find that workers with weak or uncertain preferences are 6.88 and 9.25 percentage points less likely to have a job that offers coverage than people with strong preferences (corresponding to 9.14% and 12.3% reductions in the baseline rate, respectively). We also find that workers reporting weak or uncertain preferences in response to ''health insurance is not worth the cost'' are 4.10 (p , .10) and 6.35 percentage points less likely to have a job with health insurance compared to those with strong preferences (5.44% and 8.43% reductions in the baseline rate, respectively). By comparison, we find that people with 16 years of education are 7.83 percentage points more likely to have a job with coverage than those with 12 years of education (the omitted category). Although we find a negative relationship between being a risk taker and having a job with health insurance, the marginal effect is not statistically significant. Finally, we also find evidence that other measures of attitudes toward risk are associated with a reduced likelihood of obtaining a job with health insurance. In particular, we find that single people who smoke and those who nearly always or seldom use seatbelts are 6.84, 7.37, and 8.86 percentage points less likely to have offers compared to nonsmokers and those who always wear seatbelts (results reported from the ''healthy, don't need'' model).
Other variables in each of the offer equations are consistent with the underlying search model (full results available upon request). Across all equations, single workers facing higher search costs for jobs with health insurance, such as those in fair/poor health compared to adults in excellent, very good, or good health, are less likely to have jobs with health insurance. Although we find a negative relationship between having a job offering health insurance and residing in a county with a higher proportion of small employers (establishments with fewer than 10 employees) or in a county with a higher unemployment rate, the coefficients on these variables are not statistically significant. Single workers expected to have lower out-of-pocket medical expenses, such as younger workers, those who have children predicted to be eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP, or who themselves are predicted to be eligible for Medicaid are less likely to have jobs offering ESI. The marginal effects for the latter two variables reduced the probability of an offer by more than 12 percentage points in each model (for an additional eligible child) and by more than 25 percentage points (for any parent being eligible). By contrast, we find an association between single workers expecting to incur higher medical expenditures, such as those with more children, and having a job offering coverage. Finally, we find that better educated workers are more likely to have jobs with health insurance, reflecting their lower costs of searching for such jobs, given their human capital, and perhaps their greater willingness to invest in health.
We also find evidence that preferences are associated with the likelihood that single workers enroll in offered coverage. For the two direct preference measures, we find that single individuals who have weak preferences based on ''healthy, don't need coverage'' are 6.83 percentage points less likely to enroll than those with strong preferences, while those stating that ''health insurance is not worth the cost'' are 5.84 percentage points less likely. Note that these changes represent 7.51% and 6.42% reductions in the baseline take-up rate of 90.9%. Single workers with uncertain preferences based on the ''too costly'' preference measure are 3.97 percentage points less likely to enroll than those with strong preferences, and we find that single workers who never wear seatbelts are 8.32 percentage points (p , .10, in the ''too costly'' specification) less likely than those who always wear seat belts to enroll. The logit results for all specifications reveal that young adults aged 18 to 24 are less likely to enroll in offered coverage than those 40 to 54. We also find that single workers predicted to be eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP coverage are roughly 15 percentage points less likely to enroll in offered coverage compared to those predicted to be ineligible. Affordability also appears to be an impediment to enrollment, especially for single workers who are poor/ near poor (, 125% of the federal poverty line[FPL]) or have low incomes (125% to 200% FPL). Using results from the ''don't need'' equation, such workers are 27.1 and 13.6 percentage points less likely to enroll than high-income single workers (family incomes . four times the poverty line). Additionally, we also find that those with middle incomes (201% to 399% of the poverty line) are 3.9 percentage points less likely to enroll in ESI than high-income single workers (400% or more of the poverty line). Such a result is consistent with the findings by Pierce (2001) that over time, low-wage workers in the bottom half of the compensation distribution experience a decline in fringe benefits such as health insurance compared to workers in the top half of the distribution. Finally, we find that higher employee out-ofpocket premium payments for single coverage are associated with a lower likelihood of enrollment. However, the logit coefficients and marginal effects are not precisely estimated and fail to obtain statistical significance in all specifications. 17 As noted in our introductory comments, we questioned whether commonly used demographic variables are appropriate proxies for health insurance preferences. We find that when the preference variables are omitted from each of the offer and enrollment equations, negligible changes in the magnitude and statistical significance of the remaining demographic, health status, income, and premium variables appear. This comparison suggests that variables directly assessing preferences for coverage independently account for differences in the demand for ESI, and that demographic and health status variables may be capturing other factors associated with the ease of access to jobs with coverage or with an individual's expected use of health services. This finding is also consistent with the weak relationship between demographic characteristics and the preference variables found in our estimates of multinominal logit models of health insurance preferences (results available upon request).
Conclusions and Implications
Concern over the weak response by the uninsured to initiatives encouraging voluntary enrollment in health insurance has led policymakers and researchers to question whether the uninsured value health insurance and, thus, whether policy initiatives ought to foster an awareness of the value of coverage. In this paper, we have addressed this issue by examining the association between preferences for health insurance and decisions by single workers to seek out and enroll in ESI. Our descriptive tabulations reveal that adults with weak or uncertain preferences for coverage are more likely to be uninsured all year than are those reporting strong preferences; we also find this association when we subset to workers. Our multivariate models also reveal that compared to having strong preferences for health insurance, having weak or uncertain preferences are associated with a lower likelihood that single workers will have jobs that offer ESI. These findings are consistent with our earlier research on job sorting (Monheit and Vistnes 1999) . Additionally, our present study yields evidence that compared to having strong preferences for coverage, single workers having weak or uncertain preferences have a lower likelihood of enrolling in offered ESI. Finally, we find little change in the contribution of demographic and health-related characteristics to these outcomes when the preference variables are omitted from the empirical specifications. Such a result suggests that explicit measures of preferences contribute independently from demographic and health status variables in explaining the demand for ESI by single workers, and that the latter set of variables may capture factors associated with the ease of access to jobs with ESI or with an individual's expected use of health services.
Our findings further suggest that there may be a considerable gap between the perceptions of policymakers and some of the uninsured regarding the social and private value of health insurance. The equity and efficiency considerations noted in our introductory section may not resonate with some of the uninsured. Apart from human capital considerations, such individuals with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance may value wage income with certainty over the uncertain yield of health insurance benefits, especially when the latter entails out-of-pocket premium contributions, deductibles and copayments, and excludes valued services or restricts the choice of providers.
Our results also shed light on the relative merits of encouraging enrollment through mandatory versus voluntary approaches. As regards the former, our findings suggest that the uninsured with weak or uncertain preferences for coverage are likely to experience welfare losses should health insurance be mandated absent subsidies to help offset required premium contributions. Alternatively, since we find that weak and uncertain preferences are associated with reduced probabilities of having a job that offers coverage and enrolling in ESI, our findings indicate that reliance on ''voluntarism'' alone will not be a sufficient strategy. Such voluntary efforts could be accompanied by educational interventions regarding the merits of health insurance to help effectuate a change in preferences for coverage.
We also recognize that changing preferences alone will only represent a partial effort to increase enrollment among uninsured single workers. First, using the ''healthy, don't need coverage measure,'' we find that just 28% of workers without an offer of ESI have weak or uncertain preferences. Second, the increase in coverage from changing preferences is likely to be incremental, although not trivial, for those with weak or uncertain preferences. Using results from our offer and take-up equations, and assuming that a completely successful educational intervention would change the weak preferences of single workers to strong preferences, we estimate that coverage rates for such single workers (based on the ''healthy, don't need coverage'' preference measure) would increase by 11 percentage points from a baseline coverage rate for this group of 57.9 %. 18 While this represents a healthy 19% increase above the baseline rate, it still would leave over 30% of this group without coverage.
The fact that a sizable proportion of single workers with weak or uncertain preferences still would be without coverage in this rough simulation highlights the importance of other factors in our multivariate analysis, particularly limited human capital attributes (such as low educational attainment) that may impede access to jobs offering coverage. Our multivariate work on enrollment decisions also reveals that income, and hence ability to pay, is a critical factor in insurance take-up. Nevertheless, our results indicate that changing attitudes toward the value of health insurance could have an incremental effect on both offer and take-up rates and, hence, on the coverage of single workers.
To address the impediments posed by weak and uncertain preferences for coverage, our results point to a strategy that encompasses both subsidies and educational efforts targeted at those workers most likely to exhibit such preferences. In this context, educational efforts should not merely be restricted to informing targeted groups about the presence of a new program. They also could provide more generic information regarding the purpose of health insurance, its attendant costs, and its likely impact on improving timely access to services and the quality and continuity of care. This information exchange also might focus on health plan design, soliciting feedback on valued benefits or aggressively marketing low-cost catastrophic coverage to younger single workers. Implementing a dual approach using subsidies and educational interventions might prove more effective than a strategy limited to either component.
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18 The coverage rate is the product of the offer rate and take-up rate (for those with an offer of coverage). To obtain the estimates in the text, we first compute the baseline percentage of single workers with weak preferences (using the ''healthy, don't need coverage measure'') who obtain offers of health insurance (68.0%). Next, we multiply this offer rate by the take-up rate for such workers (85.2%) and obtain a baseline coverage rate of 57.9%. To obtain the new coverage rate when preferences change from ''weak'' to ''strong,'' we do the following. We first add the marginal effect of weak preferences on offers (6.9 percentage points) to our baseline offer rate to obtain a new offer rate of 74.9%. Next, we add the marginal effect of weak preferences on takeup (6.8%) to our baseline take-up rate and obtain a new enrollment rate of 92%.
Multiplying the new offer rate by the new take-up rate yields a new coverage rate of 68.9%. The difference between the new and baseline coverage rates is the 11 percentagepoint increase in coverage that we report in the text. Applying this procedure to single workers with uncertain preferences, the increment in the coverage rate is 7.8 percentage points above a baseline rate of 49.1% (details available upon request)
